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Belgian Defence Policy: The Fight Goes On 
Sven Biscop 
The  Coalition  Agreement  of  the  Di  Rupo 
government comes at a moment when the 
international context can help overcome the 
dilemmas  of  Belgian  defence  policy: 
transformation  vs.  budget  cuts,  collective 
security  vs.  pacifism,  and  European 
vocation  vs.  stagnation  in  European 
defence. 
When  the  Cold  War  was  nearing  its  end, 
Belgium  was  one  of  the  first  to  shift  to  a 
“Europeanist”  stance  in  foreign  and  security 
policy,  from  NATO  primacy  and  territorial 
defence t o  E u r o p ean  autonomy  and  a  broad 
concept  of  security.  Realizing  the  limits  of 
individual countries, Belgium became the most 
vocal supporter of European cooperation as the 
only way of maintaining a relevant as well as 
cost-effective military capacity. Simultaneously, 
it  welcomed  the  opportunities  that  the 
unblocking  of  the  UN o f f e r ed  for  collective 
security,  in  support  of  which  since  the  early 
1990s  Belgium  has  been  engaging  in 
multinational  operations  under  UN,  NATO 
and EU-command.  
 
The  Coalition  Agreement  of  the  Di  Rupo 
government  confirms  these  orientations. 
However, this switch from territorial defence to 
expeditionary operations has generated three as 
yet  unresolved  dilemmas  for  Belgian  defence 
policy:  
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•  Transformation  of  the  armed  forces  has 
proved tortuous in the face of the cashing-
in  of  the  peace  dividend,  resulting  in  a 
sharp  decline  of  the  defence  budget  and, 
more  importantly,  a  succession  of 
unfinished reform plans, leaving the forces 
in disarray.  
 
•  The  strong  plea  for  European  defence, 
though  meant  to  reinforce  and  not  to 
compete  with  NATO,  at  times  results  in 
tensions  with  more  exclusively  NATO-
oriented EU Member States. At the same 
time it is not always followed up with actual 
participation in EU frameworks, and runs 
into the lack of cohesion and dynamism in 
European defence in the last few years.  
 
•  A tension exists between strong principled 
support  for  collective  security  through 
multilateral  organizations,  which  may 
require the use of force, and the pacifism of 
the  major  parties,  opinion-leaders  and 
public opinion alike, which is deeply rooted 
in  Belgium’s  historical  experience  as  the 
battlefield of Europe.  
 
THE LEVEL OF AMBITION  
In view of the scale of its military capabilities, 
Belgium profiles itself as a “small but reliable” 
or “responsible and credible” partner, as the 
latest  transformation  plan  (2009)  and  the 
Coalition Agreement put it.  
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Transformation of the armed forces has taken 
place  in  the  context  of  a  decreasing  defence 
budget, from 1.37 % of GDP in 2000 to an 
estimated  1.09%  in  2011.  Invariably  the 
budgets included in successive capability plans 
were revised downwards before the plan could 
be  fully  implemented.  And,  like  in  many 
countries, the investment part of the defence 
budget is often used as an easy post on which 
to  save  money  to  fill  the  overall  deficit. 
Personnel  reduction  is  the  only  means 
therefore  of  restoring  a  healthy  balance 
between  personnel  cost  (which  in  2010  still 
accounted for some two thirds, to be reduced 
to 55% by 2015), running costs (some 23%), 
and  investment  (some 1 2 % ) .   Until  now, 
however, savings thus made on personnel have 
never  been  reinvested  in  defence  but  have 
served to fill the overall deficit in the federal 
budget.  
 
Belgium  was  one  of  the  first  to  end 
conscription,  in  1993,  and  has  continued  to 
downsize  its  volunteer  forces.  The  Coalition 
Agreement provides for a further reduction to 
30,000 military and 2,000 civilian personnel by 
2015 (down from 44,500 in 2000). The stated 
aim in the 2009 transformation plan is to be 
able  to  sustain  a  concurrent  deployment o f  
1,200  troops,  which  has  effectively  been  the 
case  in  recent  years.  If  that  rhythm  of 
deployment  is  to  be  maintained h o w e v e r , 
30,000 military does seem to be the minimally 
required critical mass. Belgium should actually 
aim to increase the number of deployable and 
sustainable  forces,  which  both  the  EU  and 
NATO urge their members to do.  
 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE  
The  Coalition  Agreement  states  that  “the 
Belgian government will actively cooperate in 
the  creation  and  reinforcement  of  European 
defence,  an  essential  basis  for  a  credible 
European  foreign  policy.  This  defence  will 
enable Europe to engage in more balanced and 
hence  more  credible  partnerships  with  our 
allies,  including  within  NATO”.  While  there 
are differences in style from one government 
to another, this has been the position since the 
1990s.  Belgium’s  strong  push  for  European 
defence  during  its  EU  Presidency  in  the 
second half of 2010 was another expression of 
its European vocation.  
 
Belgium has long come to accept that in view 
of the small scale of its armed forces, common 
procurement  and  pooling  capabilities  with 
partners in permanent multinational structures 
is  the  best  way  of  maintaining  militarily 
relevant capabilities in a cost-effective manner. 
This has led, first of all, to a dense network of 
bilateral  cooperation.  The  most  far-reaching 
example is Admiral Benelux, the integration of 
the Belgian and Dutch navies. Belgium further 
is  a  part  of  European  Air  Transport 
Command, of the Eurocorps, and cooperates 
with France for pilot training, to name but the 
key examples.  
 
At  the  collective  European  level,  Belgium 
during its last EU Presidency tried to promote 
Permanent Structured Cooperation, and when 
that debate stalled, was key, with Germany, in 
launching the Ghent Initiative for Pooling & 
Sharing of capabilities (which was afterwards 
complemented by NATO’s very similar Smart 
Defence initiative). A combination of pooling, 
by  deepening  integration  in  existing 
multinational  frameworks  and  launching  new 
initiatives,  and  sharing  and  specialization, 
should create budgetary margin to address the 
strategic  shortfalls  that  both  the  EU  and 
NATO  have  identified  (and  that  the  Libyan 
crisis  has  once  again  highlighted).  If  thought 
through  to  their  logical  conclusion,  both  the 
Ghent Initiative and Smart Defence imply that 
bottom-up,  project-by-project  cooperation  be 
complemented  by  strategic  and  top-down 
coordination, of national defence planning as a 
whole,  by  the  Ministers  of  Defence.  Within 
such  a  permanent  and  structured  framework 
countries  can  focus  their  defence  effort,   3 
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identify  opportunities  for  pooling  and 
specialization,  and  do  away  with  redundant 
capabilities.  
 
The Coalition Agreement once more calls for 
“maximal  pooling  and  sharing  with o u r  
European  and  NATO  partners”,  and  for  the 
identification  of  “niches  of  excellence”  in 
which the armed forces will specialize. In spite 
of Belgium’s conceptual leadership however, its 
actual defence policy has often lagged behind. 
If  rhetoric  would  be  more  systematically 
followed  up  by  concrete  proposals  for 
exemplary  capability  initiatives,  Belgium’s 
position  would  gain  in  legitimacy  and  its 
guiding  conceptual  role  would  more  readily 
stimulate action by its fellow Member States. In 
the  context  of  Pooling  &  Sharing/Smart 
Defence,  Belgium  could  notably  propose  to 
pool t h e  eventual  successor  of  the  F16  with 
partner  countries  –  a  separate  Belgian  fighter 
force  no  longer  makes  budgetary  sense. 
Between armies, pooling and specialization in 
the E u r o c o r p s  c o n t e x t   (in  which  integration 
until now is relatively limited) can be deepened. 
Belgium  should  also  participate  to  the  fullest 
possible extent in broader European projects in 
capital-intensive  areas a s   listed  by  the  EU’s 
Foreign Affairs Council on 1 December 2011, 
such as air-to-air refuelling and ISTAR.  
 
Belgium’s  armed  forces  are  among  the  most 
integrated with other countries already, so there 
are no more quick wins in pooling and sharing. 
And of course it takes two to tango: partners 
must  be  willing  to  step  up  cooperation. 
Nevertheless,  true  to  its  European  vocation, 
Belgium  should  not  hesitate  to  be  ambitious. 
Otherwise,  its  position  risks  being s e e n  a s  
ideological rather than practical.  
 
THE USE OF FORCE  
In  view  of  the  difficult  budgetary  context, 
Belgium’s ambition has been to create in every 
component,  army,  navy  and  air,  a  less  wide-
ranging  but  well-chosen  capability  mix  that 
allows  each  to  operate  across  the  entire 
spectrum of operations. With its F16s the air 
force  can  certainly  take  part  in  combat 
operations, as proved in the Kosovo and Libya 
air campaigns, while with its frigates the navy 
participates in operation Atalanta against piracy.  
 
There is debate however about the ability of the 
army, reorganized in 2011 into two brigades, to 
operate  at  the  higher  end  of  the  spectrum 
against  a  “traditional” o p p o n e n t ,  for  lack  of 
firepower.  This  applies  especially  to  the 
“median” brigade of four battalions equipped 
with  armoured  infantry  vehicles  and 
multipurpose  protected  vehicles.  The  “light” 
brigade  of  two  paracommando  and  one  light 
battalions  plus  special  forces  is  geared t o  
operations against specific types of adversaries. 
The  additional  reduction  of  manpower  could 
force new choices upon the army; at the same 
time, additional pooling and sharing can be an 
opportunity.  
 
In  any  case,  while  recent  participation  in 
combat  operations  by  the  air  and  navy 
components  was  uncontroversial,  because  the 
cause  appeared  legal  and  just  and  because  of 
the  relatively  low  risk  entailed  for  Belgian 
troops,  deploying  the  army  on  a  combat 
operation  would  be  extremely  difficult.  Here 
the  support  for  collective  security  and 
international  law,  including  as  the  Coalition 
Agreement  states  for  the  Responsibility  to 
Protect, clashes with the still strong pacifism of 
a country which as a result of its own historic 
experience is very much averse to war.  
 
Of course no army deployment is entirely free 
of risk, as e.g. Belgian troops coming under fire 
in the Kunduz PRT in Afghanistan will testify. 
But it will have to be a very worthy cause that 
convinces  the  Belgian  people  and  its  policy-
makers  of  an  all-out  combat  operation. 
Meanwhile  some  perceive  Belgium  as  not 
sufficiently sharing the burden, or the risk, of 
collective  security  –  somewhat  undeservedly,   4   
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given its rate of deployment as compared to the 
EU  average  and  its  participation  in  operations 
such as Libya.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The budgetary pressure on all EU and NATO 
members  alike  might  help  Belgium  overcome 
some  of  the  dilemmas  that  mark  its  defence 
policy.  
 
The need to pool resources is becoming obvious 
to  all,  and  is  pushing  the  eternal  EU-NATO 
debate  into  the  background.  As  European 
countries,  under  pressure  from  a  US  urging 
Europe to develop the capacity to take care of 
crises in its own neighbourhood, are looking for 
pragmatic  and  cost-effective  solutions  by 
cooperating  among  themselves,  Belgium’s 
principled  stance  in  favour  of  European 
cooperation  is  becoming  less  controversial.  If 
Belgium  follows  this  up  with  concrete  and 
creative initiatives for further cooperation, based 
on  its  long-standing  experience,  the  country 
could play a leadership role in European defence 
cooperation, in CSDP as well as NATO.  
 
More  pooling  and  specialization  requires  a 
fundamental revision of defence planning. The 
Coalition Agreements provides for the Defence 
Minister  to  present  an  updated  multi-annual 
capability  plan,  including  an  investment  plan 
2011-2014,  following  which  reflection  should 
start on the replacement of some of the major 
platforms.  In  the  spirit  of  deepening 
cooperation, the choice of with whom Belgium 
wants to partner should be a major factor in any 
procurement  decision.  Belgium  has  a  crucial 
opportunity  to  set  an  example:  rather  than 
present a new capability plan to fellow EU and 
NATO  members  as  a  fait  accompli,  it  should 
offer  to  have  a  dialogue  with  them  about  the 
draft plan and amend it in function of collective 
EU  and  NATO  targets  and  the  intentions  of 
other countries.  
 
Most  importantly  perhaps,  a  firm  budgetary 
commitment,  over  several  years,  is  required. 
On the one hand to create the stability that the 
armed  forces  need  to  consolidate 
transformation. On the other hand to convince 
potential partners for Pooling & Sharing that 
Belgium will have the means to be indeed a 
reliable partner.  
 
The dilemma that is most defining for Belgian 
strategic  culture  however,  between  its 
historically  determined  pacifism  and  its 
principled  support  for  collective  security, 
remains difficult to resolve. The shape of the 
next  crisis  will  shape  the  Belgian  response. 
Grown  as  it  is  out  of  the  experience  of 
centuries  of  undergoing  other  States’ w a r s ,  
Belgian  strategic  culture  is  bound  to  evolve 
gradually, but perhaps at a quicker pace than 
expected,  in  the  light  of  a  fast  evolving 
strategic reality. 
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